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ABSTRACT
Hearing voices in the absence of another speaker—what
psychiatry terms an auditory verbal hallucination—is
often associated with a wide range of negative
emotions. Mainstream clinical research addressing the
emotional dimensions of voice-hearing has tended to
treat these as self-evident, undifferentiated and so
effectively interchangeable. But what happens when a
richer, more nuanced understanding of speciﬁc emotions
is brought to bear on the analysis of distressing voices?
This article draws ﬁndings from the ‘What is it like to
hear voices’ study conducted as part of the
interdisciplinary Hearing the Voice project into
conversation with philosopher Dan Zahavi’s Self and
Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame to
consider how a focus on shame can open up new
questions about the experience of hearing voices. A
higher-order emotion of social cognition, shame directs
our attention to aspects of voice-hearing which are
understudied and elusive, particularly as they concern
the status of voices as other and the constitution and
conceptualisation of the self.
Hearing a voice in the absence of an external
stimulus—what psychiatry terms an auditory
hallucination—is an experience which can take
many forms and occur in a wide variety of clinical
and non-clinical contexts.1 The heterogeneity of
voice-hearing has given rise to formal taxonomies
spanning 16th century theology,2 early 20th
century psychiatry3 4 and 21st century psych-
ology,5 6 as well as a myriad of interpretations
advanced by individuals using the cultural, medical,
spiritual and other hermeneutic frameworks avail-
able to them.7 8 While varieties of voice-hearing
are unlikely to settle into universally accepted sub-
types any time soon,9 the separation of distressing
voices from those that might be regarded as benign
or benevolent is made with clarity and consistency.
So apparently self-evident is this distinction that
the question of what exactly constitutes distress is
seldom addressed. Yet, with only a moment’s reﬂec-
tion, we can recognise that ‘distress’ could be used
to describe voices which are abusive, unrelenting,
intrusive, belligerent, hostile, repetitive, violent or
overwhelming (in their emotional tone or force and
in the semantic content of the utterance); to refer
to states of anger, fear, terror, despair, sadness,
shame, anxiety, disgust, nausea or exhaustion asso-
ciated with voice-hearing; and to imply relations of
causality, consequence, correlation or coexistence
between speciﬁc voices and emotions. Clinical and
psychological research into the experience of
hearing voices has tended to focus on auditory and
linguistic processing, and/or the relationship
between voices and thoughts; the study of
emotions, by contrast, has been relatively neglected.
With the importance of attending to the subjective
qualities of voice-hearing already recognised in psy-
chotherapeutic10 11 and Hearing Voices
Movement8 12 approaches to working with voices,
a fuller examination of the role of the emotions in
the temporally dynamic experience of hearing
voices is overdue and ripe for interdisciplinary
investigation.13
This article will focus on shame and voice-
hearing, taking as its point of departure the testi-
mony of two voice-hearers gathered by the Hearing
the Voice project (http://hearingthevoice.org) in col-
laboration with the Lived Experience Research
Network.14 Quotations from the ‘What is it like to
hear voices?’ study have been anonymised; demo-
graphic information is reported as it was
submitted:
Starting when I was about 20 years old, I heard the
voices of demons screaming at me, telling me that
I was damned, that God hated me, and that I was
going to hell. I heard them constantly, even in my
sleep. The voices were so frightening and disrup-
tive that much of the time I was unable to focus or
concentrate on anything else. […] The voices I
heard reﬂected all the judgmental attitudes I had
heard from my family and church about LGBT
identities. I internalized that shame and stigma and
my own self-loathing brain turned inward and
began persecuting itself.
- Shane (white male, queer, late 40s, atheist for-
merly Catholic, reports having been diagnosed
with schizoaffective disorder)
I was under the assumption that the total destruc-
tion of my mental faculties was imminent because
I had never heard of someone hearing voices and
being ok afterwards. I was bewildered and horri-
ﬁed at the foreign sensation and kept thinking I
must be making it up and then becoming terriﬁed
all over again when the voices persisted in their
obtrusiveness. I was very afraid and disoriented
and I didn’t feel as though I could tell anyone. An
immediate sense that this experience was clandes-
tine and something to be ashamed of was present.
- Joelle (white female, bisexual, early 20s, believes
in a Judeo-Christian God but not Christianity,
reports having been diagnosed with Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder)
Shame appears frequently in the ﬁrst-person
accounts of voice-hearers;8 15 it is a focus of
research investigating the now well-established links
between voice-hearing, trauma and childhood
sexual abuse;16–18 and within a clinical context,
cognitive–behavioural and compassion-focused
therapies19–24 explicitly address and seek to reduce
voice-hearers’ feelings of shame. Rather than
attempt to survey and synthesise these literatures, I
want here more modestly to return to ﬁrst
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principles and consider how the experience of shame might
relate to and reciprocally illuminate some experiences of
hearing voices. I say ‘some’ advisedly—in no way do I wish to
imply that shame is a meaningful or essential feature of all
voice-hearing experiences or that hearing voices is or should be
a source of shame. Shame is fascinating because it described so
powerfully as being central to people’s experience of them-
selves; it raises questions about temporality, memory, identity
and the structure of the self; and it reaches beyond the individ-
ual to the other, to their families and communities, past as well
as present. By exploring the contention that shame can also help
us understand the contents and the structure of some voice-
hearing experiences, this article seeks to identify key directions
for further research into the nexus between them.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SHAME
Shame is increasingly an object of interest across disciplines as
diverse as postcolonial literary studies,25 neuroscience26 and
development economics.27 Given my focus here on a compara-
tive analysis between the experience of shame and contempor-
ary individuals’ experiences of hearing voices, I want to start
with social psychological accounts of shame and then go on to
show how these are complicated by philosophers working in the
existential and phenomenological traditions. While I share the
concerns voiced recently by Peter Stearns—that the burgeoning
scholarship on shame has largely ignored the historical shift
from social to psychological shame and that scholars within the
social and human sciences have for the most part ‘proceeded on
their merry way without much concern for [this] lack of histor-
ical ballast’28—I hope by the end of this paper to have shown
why bringing multiple and historically informed disciplinary
perspectives to bear in analysing the experience of shame will
be vital to understanding its role in and relationship to
voice-hearing.
One of the most widely cited deﬁnitions of shame comes
from Michael Lewis’29 book Shame: The Exposed Self. Shame,
he writes, is ‘the feeling we have when we evaluate our actions,
feelings, or behaviour, and conclude that we have done wrong.
It encompasses the whole of our selves; it generates a wish to
hide, to disappear, or even to die’. Alongside guilt, embarrass-
ment and humiliation, shame has been historically30 and cross-
culturally31 understood as a negative emotion, although one
that can serve positive social functions. It is distinguished from
so-called basic emotions32 such as anger and fear by virtue of its
structural complexity: shame is a self-conscious emotion, which
requires, or at least implies, a high-order awareness of the self;
indeed, it reveals, in Lewis’29 formulation, ‘a self exposed to
itself ’. In this sense, shame is a self-reﬂective emotion but it is
also considered a social one: as well as depending, in a basic
sense, on a sophisticated awareness of others’ mental states,33
the sense of exposure, which, for many, is at the core of shame
strongly implies the presence of an interlocutor, whether in the
form of speciﬁc individuals or society and social norms more
broadly. If feelings of guilt often prompt us to seek out others
for the purposes of atonement, absolution or reparation, shame
by contrast has ‘self-oriented action tendencies’, meaning that it
typically results in social withdrawal or retreat.34 35 While guilt
and shame may share the same stimuli and even co-occur, feel-
ings of guilt pertain to speciﬁc actions, behaviours, thoughts or
responses, whereas in shame, the entire self, the core of one’s
subjectivity and identity, is felt to be devalued, diminished or
otherwise degraded.36 Shame’s effects, therefore, can be poten-
tially devastating:
the self is inwardly engaged and preoccupied, paralysed either
temporarily or permanently, and unable to engage in taking
responsibility and judgement for its own actions; a failed, deﬁled,
unwanted self cannot as a responsive and responsible agent.
Perhaps it is not surprising that a shamed person often feels
speechless – they fall out of the community of human discourse
and responsibility.37
Psychology researchers have tended to focus attention on spe-
ciﬁc moments of shame which are comparatively easy to imagine,
identify, recall, compare, and measure. These discrete episodes of
‘acute’ shame, which can help individuals adjust to social norms
and expectations, ought to be distinguished from the ‘chronic’
forms of shame, which can come to structure a person’s self and
situation in often highly negative and damaging ways.38 39 Shame
can be chronic in a temporal sense, where negative
self-evaluations are sustained and intensiﬁed through repeated
incidences or exposure to a shaming environment. Particularly
when examining experiences that are frequently labelled as
pathological and aetiologically linked to trauma, it can also be
helpful to understand as chronic, in the sense of severe, shame
that takes the form of self-stigma. The stigma associated with
mental disorders in general, and with the diagnosis of
schizophrenia or psychosis speciﬁcally, has been extensively
analysed40–43 and is, for some people, an inextricable part of the
distress of hearing voices.44
Before pursuing in more depth the relationship between
shame and voice-hearing, I want ﬁrst to turn to the work of the
philosopher Dan Zahavi, whose analysis of shame is addressed
to two fundamental questions: ‘What does the fact that we feel
shame tell us about the nature of self?’ and ‘What kind of self is
it that is affected in shame?’45 In his critical engagement with
the mainstream psychological view of shame that I have just
sketched, Zahavi focuses on the role of others and the centrality
of self-reﬂection. Can we feel shame by ourselves, or is the pres-
ence of an audience—actual or imagined—essential to the
experience? Related to this, is shame best understood as the
outcome of an evaluative process, of assessing, comparing and
judging the status of the self in relation to our ideals, values and
aspirations?
As we have already seen, the experience of shame for Lewis
hinges on a process of reﬂection, analysis and negative self-
evaluation: ‘It is not possible’, he writes, ‘to feel shame without
comparing one’s action against one’s standards or beliefs’.29
Philosophers Deonna and Teroni place an even greater emphasis
on the analytic dimension of shame by deﬁning it as ‘the subject’s
awareness that the way he is or acts is so much at odds with the
values he cares to exemplify that it appears to disqualify him
from his very commitment to the value, that is he perceives
himself as unable to exemplify it even at a minimal level’.46
Zahavi, correctly in my view, cautions against deﬁnitions which
seem so ‘cognitively demanding’ they pertain only to ‘highly
elaborate, self-directed judgemental forms of shame’.36 There
are, he suggests, more primal and prototypical forms of shame in
which it is not reﬂection but the presence of the other which is
critical to and constitutive of the experience.36
Here Zahavi turns to Jean Paul Sartre, whose account, in
Being and Nothingness, emphasises the physiological primacy of
shame. Shame is not, ﬁrst and foremost, the outcome of a delib-
erative process, but ‘an immediate shudder which runs through
me from head to foot without any discursive preparation’.47
Sartre continues:
I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realizes an intimate
relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an
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aspect of my being. Yet although certain complex forms derived
from shame can appear on the reﬂective plane, shame is not ori-
ginally a phenomenon of reﬂection. In fact no matter what
results one can obtain in solitude by the religious practice of
shame, it is in its primary structure shame before somebody.47
On this view, the other is not simply a staging post in the
process of becoming ashamed, a means to the end of negative
self-evaluation. Rather, for Sartre as for Zahavi, the object of
one’s feeling of shame is the self it is experienced for, through
and in the presence of the other. As an emotion which ‘reveals
our relationality, our being-for-others’ shame, somewhat
unnervingly, ‘makes me aware of not being in control and of
having my foundation outside myself ’.36
For Zahavi, then, it is important to distinguish phenomeno-
logically between a mode of shame which arises from sitting in
judgement on ourselves and what he thinks of as the more
prototypical experience of shame in the presence of others.
Here is a vignette representative of the scenes of ‘disgrace
shame’ which are his focus: ‘You have started a new romantic
relationship. After a while, in a moment of intimacy, you reveal
your sexual preferences. Your disclosure is met by your partner’s
incredulous stare’.36 Zahavi’s analysis draws out three features
of the phenomenology of shame as it unfolds in this scenario.
First, ‘a heightened feeling of exposure and vulnerability’,
which is accompanied by the urge to hide, withdraw or dis-
appear and can be arresting to the point of temporary physical
incapacity or paralysis. Second, a disruption to the normal tem-
poral ﬂow—rather than being caught up in evaluating past
experiences or anticipating future ones, the self is immobilised
and immersed in what Karlsson and Sjöberg describe as a
‘frozen now’.48 Finally, Zahavi notes that ‘shame, rather than
simply involving a global decrease of self-esteem and self-
conﬁdence, is also essentially characterized by the way it affects
and alters our relationship to and connectedness with others in
general’.36 In this sense, shame reveals a dimension of our self-
hood—the interpersonal self, constituted through the experi-
ence and internalisation of the perspective of the other—which
bridges the ‘minimal’ self (crudely put, the sense of a ﬁrst-
person perspective) and the more socially, culturally and tem-
porally elaborated narrative self.
A COMPARATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME AND
VOICE-HEARING
Returning to the testimonies of Shane and Joelle, we can see
shame clearly at the level of content: Shane is repeatedly
‘damned’ by his voices and told he is evil or unworthy, a judge-
ment that proves inescapable until years later he is able to
understand its origins in his community’s rejection of his sexual
identity; Joelle’s experience of ‘obtrusive’ and ‘disorienting’
voices is made doubly frightening by the looping effects of
self-stigma—her perception that she is being thrust into the
spoiled identity of being a voice-hearer whose mental faculties
are by deﬁnition destroyed. Via Zahavi’s analysis, however, we
can also start to see the close and mutually illuminating relation-
ship between shame and voice-hearing at a more structural
level. Both Shane and Joelle describe feelings of ‘exposure and
vulnerability’: a self-laid bare, an interiority intruded on by
alien voices from which there is no escape and no respite. As a
continuous and emotionally charged disruption to thinking,
articulation and communication, voice-hearing is here portrayed
as an overwhelming experience and one in which past and
future threaten to collapse into the terrifying reality of the
present. Finally, the sense of isolation and disconnection from
the social, which for Zahavi and Sartre is one of shame’s essen-
tial characteristics, is striking: Joelle immediately feels that
hearing voices is something she must not disclose and for which
she ought to be ashamed; Shane comes to recognise that the
voices which disrupted his capacity for social interaction, are
also the materialisation of a profound schism between himself
and the community in which he grew up.
‘Shame testiﬁes to our exposure, vulnerability and visibility,
and is importantly linked to such issues as concealment and dis-
closure, sociality and alienation, separation and interdepend-
ence, difference and connectedness’ writes Zahavi.36 The
primacy of vision to the experience and conceptualisation of
shame is further emphasised by Michael Uebel in his explication
of its ethical functions:
Shame is an emotion routed through the eyes and its
mise-en-scène is thus specularity and exposure, involving the
spatial organization of a spectator who can be external, internal,
or both at once. […] Shame is preeminently visual; guilt is aural.
[…and] Shame necessitates an audience, even when that audience
is what is least desired, or struggled against.49
Examining an emotion ‘routed through the eyes’ alongside
the experience of a voice which cannot be seen alerts us to the
ubiquity of metaphor in our efforts to describe inner experience
and to the spatial dynamics of self and other. Returning, then,
to the key question motivating Zahavi’s analysis: what kind of
self is it that is affected in shame and hears voices? Could
certain experiences of hearing voices, such as those we have
brieﬂy touched on here, offer an intrapsychic model of the
dynamics of shame, to the extent that voices are understood to
give a kind of direct perceptual form as well as agency to the
perspective and negative judgement of the other? If Zahavi is
right that shame discloses something fundamentally important
about the role of others not just in the experience but in the
constitution of the self, what could a more detailed examination
of the voice as self-constituting-other yield? Does the intensity
and persistence of distressing voice-hearing experiences impli-
cate or bear resemblances to forms of shame which are poten-
tially excessive, unrelenting or unresolved? And how might
other emotions, moods and affects be involved? In raising these
questions, Zahavi’s analysis points us towards three major areas
of further exploration in the comparative cultural phenomen-
ology of shame and voice-hearing.
Chronic shame
Zahavi’s focus, as we have seen, is on ‘disgrace shame’. The exam-
ples he discusses are discrete, episodic exchanges between two or
more individuals, which have a physiological immediacy rendering
them primary, prototypical and phenomenologically distinct from
more reﬂective forms of shame. Zahavi does not rule out the pos-
sibility of such instances having long-lasting effects, but what
about cases where shame is experienced repeatedly and systematic-
ally; where it is linked to trauma, violence and a wider sense of
psychic and physical insecurity; and where it becomes a quality of
the familial and social environment itself? Zahavi’s analysis, in
other words, falls short of investigating what others have called
chronic shame, shame that is generated by ‘experiences that
induce a sense of persistent inferiority, worthlessness, abandon-
ment, weakness, abjection, unwantedness, violation, deﬁlement,
stigmatisation, unloveablility and social exclusion’.38 This limita-
tion is not insigniﬁcant; as Stephen Pattison notes, there is:
an enormous difference between acute, reactive shame and the
chronic shame that shapes a whole personality and may last a life-
time. When individuals appear to experience the whole of life as
Woods A. Med Humanit 2017;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/medhum-2016-011167 3
Original article
group.bmj.com on July 18, 2017 - Published by http://mh.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
actually or potentially shame-productive and manifest such symp-
toms as withdrawal, self-contempt, inferiority, and gaze aversion
as a matter of course throughout their everyday lives, shame has
become pathological and chronic.38
Notwithstanding several very vivid examples of voice-hearing
arising in the context of episodes of acute shame,50 it is more
often the case that voices speak of distress that is better under-
stood as cumulative, structural, enduring or all-encompassing.
Indeed, recent research on the relationship between childhood
adversity and psychosis has conﬁrmed earlier evidence of a
dose–response relationship (ie, that the total number of adverse
experiences such as physical or sexual abuse signiﬁcantly pre-
dicts the appearance and severity of voice-hearing), while also
showing that ‘two adversities showing the largest number of
associations with psychotic symptoms were poverty and being
fostered/adopted’.18 So while Zahavi’s account of shame can
help illuminate the ‘now’ of hearing voices (the phenomenology
and affective dynamics of the instance in which the voice is
heard), experiences of voice-hearing, particularly those that are
linked to adversity, might prove particularly fertile for exploring
the distinctive phenomenology of chronic shame and for high-
lighting the importance of sociological analysis to that
endeavour.
Voice as other
The second set of questions Zahavi’s account of shame might
prompt us to ask about voices concerns their status or ontology:
(how) are voices others? For some biomedically oriented halluci-
nations researchers, the proposition that voices might be best
understood in terms of the representation of social agents,51
rather than as symptoms of aberrant auditory processing, is
already radical. However, within other clinical and psychothera-
peutic settings, relational frameworks are routinely used to
support voice-hearers to develop more positive relationships
with their voices11 52 in the way that approaches voices as
though they were family members or close acquaintances.
Assigning the voice the same status as a person may have prac-
tical beneﬁts in a therapeutic context but struggles to account
for or attend to the phenomenological heterogeneity of voices.
Highly ‘personiﬁed’ voices should not be treated as self-evident:
for example, while a majority of participants in the ‘What is it
like to hear voices?’ study reported that they heard ‘characterful’
voices, one third of respondents indicated that there was
nothing person-like about the experience. Of those who did
report ‘characterful’ voices, descriptions suggested:
a range of person-like qualities, from amorphous entitativity (an
undeﬁned disembodied personality), to stereotypical person-like
presentations (an angry man, an old woman), spiritual entities
with anthropomorphic traits, speciﬁcally recognisable individuals,
and voices that are subjectively experienced as representing all or
part of the person’s own self.14
If we are to develop richer accounts of the dynamics of
shame and other emotions in voice-hearing experiences, then
we must attend more closely to the particular qualities of the
agents and entities they most intimately involve. It will also be
important not to limit analysis to voices which are bullying or
abusive in language and tone, but consider the variety of
perhaps more subtle ways in which voices might contribute,
positively and negatively, to voice-hearers’ experience of shame.
Whatever their ontology, if we nonetheless accept that voices
are for a majority of people experienced as other (as being ‘not
me’, as something over which the person has little or no control),
then the notion of the interpersonal self, as revealed in Zahavi’s
account of shame, offers new ways of conceptualising the self
and other of voice-hearing. Whether psychiatric, psychological,
neuroscientiﬁc, sociological or spiritual, most frameworks for
understanding voices take up one of two positions—either
(1) the ‘voice’ is fundamentally independent of the ‘self ’ (a dis-
ruption in brain activity; the symptom of an underlying biomed-
ical disease; a divine or other-worldly agency) or (2) the ‘voice’ is
fundamentally of the ‘self ’ (a misrecognised, disowned or disso-
ciated part; a fragment that can be reintegrated into or at least
recognised as belonging to the whole). Zahavi’s analysis of an
interpersonal self which does not exist independently of or prior
to the encounter with other, but is in fact constituted by it, trou-
bles this dichotomy with the radical proposition that the voice
might be productive of the self.
Voices beyond the self
In her powerful analysis of a cultural shift from guilt to shame,
Ruth Leys notes that contemporary theorising of shame fre-
quently ‘posits a rigid dichotomy and specular distance between
the autonomous subject and the external other’.53 Voice-hearing
clearly complicates this at every conceivable level, and the work
of cultural and affect theorists Grace Cho and Lisa Blackman
explicitly implicates shame in the permeability of boundaries
between the self and other in voice-hearing. Cho draws on psy-
choanalytic theories of ‘transgenerational haunting’54 to explore
the powerful but unspeakable legacies of the Korean War, par-
ticularly through the ﬁgure of the yanggongju (a term used to
refer pejoratively to Korean women who have had sex with
American men).55 The yanggongju, embodying a shame which
cannot be spoken, haunts the Korean diaspora, posing the ques-
tion: ‘When the subject cannot speak her own history, when
history is unintelligible or made unintelligible, who or what
speaks for her?’55 Cho invites us to read the hallucinated voices
heard by contemporary Korean women not as symptoms of an
underlying illness but as the ‘spectral voice of the diasporic
unconscious, a voice that has seen things that the hearer has not
and that bears witness to the other’s past and to the pasts she
has inherited.’55 The idea that ‘One’s mother’s voices could be
one’s grandmother’s memories’55 shows, as Blackman argues,
how voice-hearing experiences:
act on the boundary or threshold between the corporeal and
incorporeal, material and immaterial, self and other, psycho-
logical and social, past and present, inside and outside, and open
our theorizations of affect to the complex forms of mediation
which necessarily distribute the psyche beyond a closed, singular,
psychological subject.56
The work of Blackman and Cho opens up new ways of con-
ceptualising the self and other of voice-hearing as testifying to
the interpersonal and intergenerational dynamics of shame. In
so doing, it also suggests that phenomenology is not simply col-
oured by but more fundamentally constituted through a
network of social relations which cannot be abstracted from
wider logics of race, class, gender, sexuality and history.
CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The literatures on shame and on voice-hearing are extensive,
interdisciplinary and deserving of a deeper analysis than has
been possible here. Rather than seek to reconcile, synthesise or
arbitrate between them, I hope instead to have shown that the
intersections between these literatures demand analysis that is
alive to competing models of shame (from social psychology,
phenomenology, cultural theory and the history of emotion), to
a variety of ways of understanding the phenomenology and
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aetiology of hearing voices, and to the potential for there to be
complex interactions between them at the level of testimony as
well as theorisation. In its emphasis on the presence of other,
Zahavi’s discussion of shame is, I have argued, particularly
helpful in analysing the way self and other are conceptualised
and constituted in experiences of voice-hearing. Speciﬁcally,
Zahavi’s notion of the interpersonal and inherently other-
constituted self might better equip us to attend to the complex-
ity of voice-hearers’ self-constituting relationships with the other
of their voices, which in turn could help nuance the models of
shame that inform relational, compassionate mind and cogni-
tive–behavioural therapy approaches. Finally, and with the testi-
mony of Shane and Joelle ﬁrmly in mind, this analysis has
shown that we need to understand and account for shame at
multiple levels: to grasp how the shaming experience of abusive
voices that no one else can hear relates to the public stigma of
being a voice-hearer; how homophobia can manifest in and as
an internal demonic drama and how voices might bear the
traces of trauma experienced collectively as well as individually.
A robust and critical medical humanities approach13 57 to these
issues will call on a wide range of disciplinary and clinical
expertise and, crucially, ensure that people who hear voices, and
for whom shame is an intimate and painful aspect of experi-
ence, are at the forefront of future investigations.
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